Derrida is typically taken to be the thinker most antithetical to Hegel, and deconstruction to be the philosophical antithesis to Hegel’s systematic rationality. While I do not dispute the accuracy of this perception, I argue in this paper that it does not offer an adequate or a complete picture. Specifically, much about Derrida and about deconstruction is more similar to Hegel than is typically realized. I argue that Derrida’s deconstruction shares a great affinity to the method of Hegel’s Phenomenology of (...) Spirit, so much so that we could identify and articulate a latent Hegelianism in Derrida’s approach. I begin with a description of Derrida’s own project, then offer something of an apologia for his work. Finally, I describe Hegel’s method of exposition [Darstellung] and compare it to deconstruction, pointing out the fundamental similarities between the two thinkers. (shrink)

Levinas and other contemporary thinkers have claimed that the philosophy of "the other" provides a devastating critique of systematic rationality as such and of Hegel as a paradigm case thereof.The critique links an ethical moment and socio-political issues to a thorough-going critique of Hegelian metaphysics and the dialectical method. I articulate the meaning of alterity as a critique of Hegel through Levinas and Marx, and then discuss possible Hegelian responses to this criticism. I conclude that this critique of Hegel pertains (...) to the character of his final synthesis rather than to questions of difference and identity, and challenge the interpretation of Hegelian closure as the realization of eschatology. (shrink)

In Capital as Organic Unity, Mark E. Meaney argues “that the doctrinal content of Marx’s Grundrisse is indebted for its logical form to Hegel’s exposition of logical categories as found in the Wissenschaft der Logik”. Meaney builds upon an important work by Hiroshi Uchida which had already explored Marx’s debt in the Grundrisse to Hegel’s Logic. But beyond Uchida’s claims, Meaney maps the entire structure of the Grundrisse onto the parallel movements of Hegel’s larger Science of Logic. Meany’s text contains (...) seven chapters. Besides the introduction and conclusion, one chapter discusses money as being, two discuss capital as essence or the essence of capital, and two more discuss the concept of capital in its objective, conceptual completeness. Capital is for Marx a concrete manifestation of Hegel’s objectification of the concept. (shrink)